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The Categorical Exclusion of Single Women and Same-Sex 
Couples from Infertility Services and its Role in Defining 
What Constitutes Justified and Unjustified Limitations on 
Reproductive Freedom 
Crystal Liu* 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of reproductive technologies such as 
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization (IVF) has given 
infertile couples a way to procreate.  Given that reproductive 
technologies involve potential children and parentage, there 
has been much debate as to if, and how, this realm should be 
regulated.  While the regulation of reproductive technologies 
can exist in a variety of forms, for the purpose of this note I will 
focus on the restriction of access to these technologies.  More 
specifically, whether access to infertility services should be 
limited as a means to restrict the ability for single women and 
same-sex couples to procreate and rear children. 
The United States is a leader in assisted reproductive 
technologies, but it has been extremely hesitant to provide 
oversight of these technologies at a federal governmental level.1  
While advisory committees and professional self regulation 
provide oversight to a certain extent, there is no official body 
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 1. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, 
AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 5 (2006). 
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within the United States with adequate enforcement powers to 
regulate infertility research and services.2  In contrast, 
Australia, also a leader in ART, has provided oversight at both 
the state and national level.3  More specifically, the state of 
Victoria became “the first common law jurisdiction in the 
world” to regulate technologies in this field through 
legislation.4 
Given the two plus decades in which Victoria has regulated 
infertility services, the United States can look to the Victorian 
experience when reviewing its current system of oversight. The 
aim of this paper is to recommend appropriate types of access 
restrictions for the United States by conducting an in depth 
case study on the history of access requirements in Victoria, 
Australia. 
Part one provides background information about infertility 
and various types of assisted reproductive technologies.  Part 
one also offers a brief explanation as to the science behind 
these techniques. 
Part two provides a synopsis of historical examples in 
which reproductive freedoms have been limited and the lessons 
that can be drawn from them.  For purposes of this article, 
reproductive freedom refers not only to the ability to procreate 
but to the ability to be a parent as well.  First, I will discuss the 
eugenics movement in the early 1900s, and the forced 
sterilizations that were utilized as a means to promote the good 
of society.  Second, I will discuss adoption and the factors that 
are considered when limiting the adoptive placement of 
children. Third, I will discuss the role of child protective 
services in ensuring that children are not in situations that 
pose a risk of harm. In all three of these historical (and current) 
examples, informal or formal restrictions have been placed on 
reproductive freedoms. 
Part three provides a brief overview of three jurisdictions 
that have approached the issue of regulating access to 
                                                          
 2. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES (2004), at 174-
79. 
 3. See Helen Szoke, Australia—A Federated Structure of Statutory 
Regulation of ART, in THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 75–78 (Jennifer Gunning & Helen Szoke eds., 2003), for a 
discussion of the various types of ART regulation in the Australian states. 
 4. Id. at 75. 
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reproductive technologies differently.  Part three then focuses 
on the Victorian access provision and the major events that 
have occurred throughout the history of this legislative 
provision. 
Part four analyzes the challenges that have been made to 
the Victorian access requirements and discusses reasons why 
there have been both successful and unsuccessful challenges to 
this provision.  While only married couples were eligible to 
access infertility services under the original legislation, this 
legislation was later challenged and amended to expand access 
to de facto couples.  However, a subsequent challenge yielded 
little legislative response, and single women and same-sex 
couples have yet to be accorded full access to infertility 
services.  In comparing the two challenges, I will examine the 
variation between them and probe whether this differential 
outcome is warranted.  The lessons that can be learned from 
both the Victorian experience in restricting access to infertility 
services, and the historical examples of restricting reproductive 
freedom, lead to the conclusion that it is improper to 
categorically exclude single women and same-sex couples from 
infertility services. 
I. THE STRUGGLE WITH INFERTILITY 
A. INFERTILITY 
Infertility is, generally, either a specific medical condition 
or the inability to conceive over a set period of time.5  There are 
several medical conditions that can cause male and female 
infertility.6  Female infertility can be the result of 
endometriosis, pelvic inflammatory disease, and polycystic 
ovary syndrome, as well as many other causes.7  Male 
                                                          
 5. See EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW, TECHNOLOGY 
AND AUTONOMY 162 (2001) (pointing out that while “[a]n objective definition of 
infertility is . . . probably impossible,” the definitions typically include failure 
to conceive over a set time); RACHEL KRANZ, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY 5-6 (2002) (calling infertility a medical malfunction or an 
inability to get pregnant). 
 6. KRANZ, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
 7. EhealthMD, What Causes Infertility, 
http://www.ehealthmd.com/library/infertility/INF_causes.html (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2008). Endometriosis occurs when the uterine lining grows into the 
vagina, ovaries, fallopian tubes or pelvis, resulting in cysts that may then 
block the passage of the egg.  Id. Pelvic inflammatory disease occurs when the 
pelvis or reproductive organ become infected.  Id. Polycystic ovary syndrome 
occurs when the ovaries produce excess male and female hormones, resulting 
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infertility can be the result of several different factors, for 
example sperm problems (low sperm count, sperm of a poor 
mobility) and difficulty with ejaculation.8 
Despite the many factors that can lead to infertility, an 
individual’s or couple’s infertility often cannot be diagnosed as 
a specific medical condition.9  In such instances, infertility is 
explained not by a medical condition, but defined by the 
inability to conceive or carry a pregnancy to full term over a set 
period of time.10  The World Health Organization defines this 
period of time as two years, while the standard medical 
definition is twelve months, or at least three consecutive 
miscarriages or stillbirths.11  According to data obtained from 
the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, twelve percent of 
women in 2002 experienced infertility.12  Given that this 
accounts for over seven million women between the ages of 
fifteen and forty-four, there is an understandable demand for 
infertility research and services.  It is also important to note 
that while there is debate as to whether or not same-sex 
couples and single women are considered infertile, these 
categories of persons are also unable to conceive given their 
social circumstances.13 
B. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (ART) 
The development of a variety of alternative conception 
methods introduced methods by which couples and individuals 
suffering from infertility could try to conceive.  Intrauterine 
insemination, either using sperm from the male partner or a 
donor, involves the insertion of collected sperm into the 
reproductive tract of the woman.14  One of the more common 
ART procedures is in vitro fertilization.15  By using 
                                                          
in the follicles forming fluid-filled cysts rather than producing eggs. Id. 
 8. KRANZ, supra note 5, at 6. 
 9. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 162 (claiming that for some, the medical 
condition is either temporary or of an unexplained source). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., SER. 23, NO. 25, FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH OF U.S. WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY 
GROWTH 21–22 (2005). 
 13. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 162. 
 14. KRANZ, supra note 5, at 20. 
 15. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 166. 
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hyperstimulatory drugs to stimulate the maturation of ovarian 
follicles, eggs can be collected using a technique such as 
laparoscopy.16  The egg is then fertilized with sperm in an 
artificially created environment that is conducive to embryo 
development.17  Embryos are typically implanted into the 
woman’s uterus between two and five days after the initial 
fertilization.18  There are a number of other procedures that 
can be used to treat infertility—gamete intrafallopian transfer 
(GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), and intra-
cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI).19 
II. HISTORY OF LIMITATIONS PLACED ON 
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOMS 
Reproductive freedom, for the purposes of this article, 
refers to “the freedom to determine when, whether, and under 
what conditions one will or will not bear children.”20  This 
freedom extends not only to the conditions surrounding having 
children, but also to the freedom to rear a child as well.  Like 
other freedoms, reproductive liberty is not absolute and is 
subject to a variety of restrictions.21  Over the past century, 
restrictions on reproductive freedom have taken several 
forms.22  By exploring limitations that have been enacted, some 
of which have been repealed while others remain, it is possible 
to recognize what constitutes an acceptable limitation. 
                                                          
 16. ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY 
FROM LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 147–48 (1989). 
 17. KRANZ, supra note 5, at 23. 
 18. Id. 
 19. In GIFT, the egg and sperm are inserted into the women’s fallopian 
tubes such that successful fertilization occurs in vivo. Id. at 23. In ZIFT, eggs 
are retrieved and fertilized in vitro but are transferred back into the women’s 
fallopian tubes much sooner than the typical 2-5 days in IVF. Id. at 23–24. In 
ICSI, eggs are retrieved and fertilized in vitro with a single sperm using a 
microsurgical needle, and successful fertilization yields a zygote that can be 
transferred into the women’s uterus. Id. at 24; see also JACKSON, supra note 5, 
at 167–68  (explaining the procedures in GIFT and ICSI, and the situations in 
which they are used). 
 20. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky. Reproduction, Ethics, and Public Policy: 
The Federal Sterilization Regulations 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1979, at 
29, 29. 
 21. See JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22–42 (1994) (describing procreative liberty as 
a right, and the various constraints that can act upon it). 
 22. See discussion infra Part II. 
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A. EUGENICS AND FORCED STERILIZATIONS 
The regulation of reproductive freedom is not a new 
phenomenon.  Old concepts have merely been redefined in the 
age of reproductive technologies.  As early as the 1900s, states 
passed statutes providing for the forced sterilization of those it 
deemed unfit.23  In Buck v. Bell, the United State Supreme 
Court upheld a lower court’s decision that a Virginia act that 
allowed for the sterilization of those who were mentally 
defective was not unconstitutional.24  Prior to being sterilized, 
Carrie Buck had been committed to the Virginia Colony for 
Epileptics and Feebleminded in June 1924, only four years 
after her mother had been committed.25  Carrie’s daughter, 
Vivian, was deemed below average in intelligence by Arthur 
Estabrook (a field researcher who worked for the Eugenic 
Record Office) and “not quite normal” by a nurse.26  The ruling 
by the Court, in particular Justice Holmes’ opinion, 
underscored a state’s ability to limit the reproductive freedom 
of those it deemed socially inadequate.27 
This Virginia act was only one of several programs 
promoted as part of the eugenics movement in the early 
1900s.28  Eugenics was based on the belief that unfit 
                                                          
 23. See Frances Oswald, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States 36 
AM. J. SOC. 65, 67 (1930) (noting that Indiana in particular authorized the 
sterilization of “confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists”). 
 24. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 200-201 (1927). The Virginia act allowed 
for the sterilization of those who were considered feeble minded as a means to 
safeguard the health of the patient and promote the welfare of society. Id. 
 25. Paul A. Lombardo, Facing Carrie Buck, 33 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 14., 15 
 26. Id. at 16. 
 27. Id. at 14 (noting that Justice “Holmes’ opinion became the rallying cry 
for American eugenicists.”); see 274 U.S. at 207 (Holmes, J.) : 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon 
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call 
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser 
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to 
prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the 
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, 
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those 
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle 
that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting 
the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough. 
(citation omitted). 
 28. See generally ANNE KERR & TOM SHAKESPEARE, GENETIC POLITICS: 
FROM EUGENICS TO GENOME 16 (2002) (discussing the relevance of the 
eugenics movement in The Johnston-Reed Act of 1924, an immigration policy 
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characteristics were inheritable and that the stock of the 
population could be improved by preventing the transmission of 
these traits.29  Eugenic programs were viewed as a means to 
enhance the strength of the nation.30  While the eugenics 
movement has largely been discredited and Virginia has since 
issued an official apology renouncing its involvement in the 
forced sterilization of those deemed ‘unfit’, the limitation of 
reproductive freedoms has continued, albeit in different 
forms.31 
B. Adoption 
Adoption is yet another realm in which reproductive 
freedoms are limited by a complicated set of state, federal, and 
international laws.32  However, it is at the state level, with a 
few exceptions, that adoptions are actually authorized.33  
Adoption has important social and legal implications.34  
Legally, adoption severs the relationship between a child and 
his biological family and establishes a relationship between the 
child and the adoptive parents.35  From a social perspective, the 
child is being placed with parent(s) who are prepared to assume 
parental responsibilities because their biological parent(s) are 
unwilling or unable to do so.36 
These adoptive relationships have traditionally been based 
on several factors.  Central among them is the attempt to serve 
                                                          
that restricted immigration from southern and eastern Europe, the Balkans, 
and Russia. This Act was passed partly on the belief that “the recent 
immigrants, as a whole, present a higher percentage of inborn socially 
inadequate qualities that do the older stock”); ELLEN CHELSER, WOMAN OF 
VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 
313–35 (1992) (discussing how birth control was used as a means to weed out 
the unfit). 
 29. See generally RICHARD LYNN, EUGENICS: A REASSESSMENT 58 (2001) 
(noting various justifications for eugenics developed by others, including 
physical courage, beauty, and the like). 
 30. See generally id. at 95-96 (noting the general belief that if the 
intelligence level of the population could be increased, a number of desirable 
social outcomes would follow and a number of undesirable social phenomena 
would be reduced). 
 31. See id. at 16 (2003). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-101 to 8-173 
(2007); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7660–9300 (2004.). 
 32. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, FUTURE CHILD., Spring 1993, 
at 43, 43, http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/vol3no1ART3.PDF. 
 33. Id. at 43. 
 34. Id. at 44. 
 35. Id. at 43-44. 
 36. Id. at 44. 
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the child’s best interests by finding suitable adoptive parents.37  
There is, however, no real test as to what “best interests” 
means, and it has been interpreted in a variety of ways.38  
While some people are straightforwardly categorized as 
ineligible to adopt children based on their criminal background, 
it is currently debatable whether factors such as marital status, 
sexual orientation, and ethnicity should affect whether a 
placement is made.39 
In many states, “courts, legislature, and child welfare 
agencies now acknowledge the unfairness of excluding people 
from consideration as adoptive parents solely on the basis of 
‘unconventional’ characteristics pertaining to their marital or 
financial status, age, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or 
ability to bear children.”40  The passage of the Small Business 
Jobs Protection Act in 1996 prohibited adoption agencies from 
using race to delay or deny adoption placement.41  It is still 
unclear, however, whether adoption agencies can consider an 
adoptive parents’ racial or cultural sensitivity in denying 
adoption.42 
Crucial to the controversy regarding the appropriateness of 
considering such factors as marital status, racial, or cultural 
sensitivity is the belief that placement of children based on 
                                                          
 37. See id. at 48–49 (noting that the second element is “serving the child’s 
interests by placement with suitable adoptive parents” and that most state 
adoption statutes require adherence to this element). 
 38. See id. at 48. 
 39. See id. at 48. 
 40. Id. at 48; see also Recent Case, Family Law—Adoption—
Massachusetts Allows Biological Mother and her Lesbian Partner Jointly to 
Adopt Child, 107 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1994) [hereinafter Massachusetts Allows] 
(discussing Adoption of Tammy, in which adoption was sanctioned for a same-
sex couple). 
 41. Recent Legislation, Transracial Adoption—Congress Forbids Use of 
Race as a Factor in Adoptive Placement Decisions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 
1352 (1997) [hereinafter Transracial Adoption]. The relevant section of the 
Small Business Jobs Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18) (2000),  states: 
 (18) . . . neither the State nor any other entity in the State that 
receives funds from the Federal Government and is involved in 
adoption or foster care placements may— 
(A) deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a 
foster parent, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the 
person, or of the child, involved; or 
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster 
care, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive 
or foster parent, or the child, involved. 
 42. Transracial Adoption, supra note 41, at 1352. 
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such factors is in the best interests of children.43  For example, 
the National Association of Black Social Workers has taken a 
position against transracial adoptions on the grounds that 
black children need to be raised by black parents in order to 
“develop a positive racial identity” and “to develop skills for 
coping with a racist society.”44 
It is evident, then, that while there is disagreement as to 
what limitations should be relevant in adoption placements, 
there is agreement that efforts should be taken to ensure the 
well being of the child.45  Accordingly, restrictions on 
reproductive freedom, regarding who is eligible to adopt, are 
accepted in exchange for the positive long-term benefits of 
placing children in suitable homes.46 
                                                          
 43. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The 
Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children 92 MICH. L. REV. 925, 925–26 
(1994). 
 44. The following passage details the organization’s thinking: 
The National Association of Black Social Workers has taken a 
vehement stand against the placement of Black children in white 
homes for any reason. We affirm the inviolable position of Black 
children in Black families where they belong physically, 
psychologically and culturally in order that they receive the total 
sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future. . . . 
. . . Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy 
developmentof themselves as Black people, which development is the 
normal expectation and only true humanistic goal.  Identity grows on 
the three levels of all human development; the physical, psychological 
and cultural and the nurturing of self identity is a prime function of 
the family. The incongruence of a white family performing this 
function for a Black child is easily recognized. The physical factor 
stands to maintain that child’s difference from his family. There is no 
chance of his resembling any relative. One’s physical identity with his 
own is of great significance. . . . 
. . . In our society, the developmental needs of Black children are 
significantly different from those of white children. Black children are 
taught, from an early age, highly sophisticated coping techniques to 
deal with racist practices perpetrated by individuals and 
institutions. . . . Only a Black family can transmit the emotional and 
sensitive subtleties of perception and reaction essential for a Black 
child’s survival in a racist society. Our society is distinctly black or 
white and characterized by white racism at every level. We repudiate 
the fallacious and fantasied reasoning of some that whites adopting 
Black children will alter that basic character. 
Id. at 926–27 (1994). 
 45. See Massachusetts Allows, supra note 40, at 751 (“The Massachusetts 
SJC has set an important precedent for homosexual rights. In looking to the 
‘best interests of the child’ . . . .”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 43, at 929 (“When 
considering the placement of a child, the states generally charge courts with 
protecting the best interests of the child.”). 
 46. See Hollinger, supra note 32, at 44. For a background on adoption, see 
SPAR, supra note 1, at 159–93 (discussing the practice and politics of 
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C. Child Protective Services 
In addition to restrictions on adoption placement, child 
protection laws illustrate that it is unacceptable for a parent to 
be engaged in child abuse or neglect.47  Central to each of these 
limitations is the notion that these restrictions protect the 
interests of children by limiting who can be parents.  Unlike 
eugenic ideology that supported forced sterilizations, child 
protective laws have largely been viewed as a justified 
limitation based on the need to protect a more vulnerable 
population.48 
Child protection laws that limit reproductive freedoms 
exist at the local, state, and federal levels.49  The Child Abuse 
and Prevention Treatment Act, originally passed in 1974, aims 
to protect children from physical and sexual abuse.50  In 
addition, federal law requires public child welfare agencies to 
take action when accounts of child abuse and neglect are 
reported.51  Child protection service workers are authorized, 
under certain circumstances, to seek court approval to remove 
the child from the home.52  This is, arguably, the most 
restrictive type of reproductive limitation, as it removes the 
child from the home and prevents reunification unless parent(s) 
                                                          
adoption). 
 47. See generally Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5106, 
5116, 5118 (2000)). 
 48. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1386(XIV) (Nov. 20, 
1959), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/25.htm (“[T]he child, 
by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and 
care, including appropriate legal protection . . . .”). 
 49. Janet E. Findlater and Susan Kelly, Child Protective Services and 
Domestic Violence. FUTURE CHILD., Winter 1999, at 85. 
 50. Kerwin Kaye, Sexual Abuse Victims and the Wholesome Family: 
Feminist, Psychological, and State Discourses, in REGULATING SEX: THE 
POLITICS OF INTIMACY AND IDENTITY 143, 143 (Elizabeth Bernstein and 
Laurie Schaffner eds., 2005).  The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
was rewritten and became the Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption and Family 
Services Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-294), which was later amended by the 
Child Abuse Prevention Challenge Grants Reauthorization Act of 1989 (Pub. 
L. No. 101-126) and the Drug Free School Amendments of 1989 (Pub. L. No. 
101-226). See Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Serv., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/cblaws/capta/index.htm (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2008). 
 51. See Findlater & Kelly, supra note 49, at 85. 
 52. Id. at 86. 
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satisfactorily complete a reunification plan.53  These severe 
limitations are defended on the grounds that child abuse poses 
a severe risk of harm to children.54  Studies have shown that 
there are negative developmental outcomes for children 
exposed to violence in the home.55 
D. Learning from These Experiences 
These examples have shown that reproductive freedoms 
are not absolute, and that they exist in relationship to other 
concerns.56  While the eugenics movement has largely been 
discredited, child protection and adoption laws remain mostly 
intact as means to ensure the protection of children.  The 
advent of reproductive technologies has reopened the question 
concerning what is an appropriate restriction on reproductive 
freedoms, given that it is not uncommon for governments, or 
even private clinics, to limit who has access to infertility 
services.57  The task, then, is to identify what is an appropriate 
restriction in this new realm of reproductive technologies. 
Acceptable limitations are judged in part by looking closely 
at who is being protected and for what reasons.58  During the 
eugenics movement, the forced sterilization of those considered 
“unfit” was a means to prevent the transmission of their unfit 
                                                          
 53. See id. at 86; C.C. Carstens, The Development of Social Work for Child 
Protection 98 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 135,19 (noting 
that the removal of children from the home is “[a] course [that] is so abhorrent 
to certain people who do not realize the menace that a brutal parent or an 
immoral home may provide both to the child and to the welfare of the 
community . . . “). 
 54. See id. at 138. 
 55. See generally John W. Fantuzzo &Wanda K. Mohr, Prevalence and 
Effects of Child Exposure to Domestic Violence FUTURE CHILD., Winter 1999, 
at 21, 27 (discussing the harms posed to children from domestic violence); see 
also Joy D. Osofsky, The Impact of Violence on Children, FUTURE CHILD., 
Winter 1999, at 33) (“Infants and toddlers who witness violence either in their 
homes or in their community show excessive irritability, immature behavior, 
sleep disturbances, emotional distress, fears of being alone, and regression in 
toileting and language.”). 
 56. See Petchesky, supra note 20, at 30 (discussing how “[i]ndividual 
women exercise, limit, or lose their capacity to bear children in relation to 
others to whom they are responsible and who are responsible for them—sexual 
partners, parents, children; and wider communities beyond the family”). 
 57. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 58. See Petchesky, supra note 20, at 36 (“It would appear that the only 
way to distinguish justifiable from unjustifiable ‘protective’ laws and rules—
that is, those that provide the necessary preconditions for moral and social 
autonomy from those that paternalistically deny such autonomy—is to look 
concretely at who is being protected and from what.”). 
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genes to later generations. 59 It was also based on the 
assumption that it was in their best interests—i.e., that they 
were incapable of handling reproductive responsibilities.60  
However, the assumptions required to posit such justifications 
have largely fallen into disrepute.61  Furthermore, to assume, 
in the absence of evidence, that there are categories of people 
who are incapable of being good parents is discriminatory.  
Thus, restricting reproductive freedoms in a manner similar to 
the eugenics movement is unwarranted and an alternative 
approach may be more desirable.62 
Child protection laws are aimed at protecting children from 
abuse and neglect, and are not based on a belief that certain 
categories of people should not be parents.63  Rather, there is a 
recognition of the importance of family safety as well as the 
risk of harm to children exposed to family violence.64  In such 
situations, child protection services work with the family to 
determine what services and support are needed in order to 
achieve a safe environment for the child.65 In a similar fashion, 
adoption laws are focused on providing placements that are in 
                                                          
 59. See Oswald, supra note 23, at 65 (arguing that eugenics has become 
more important in light of the advancements made regarding the role of 
heredity in physical and mental defects ). 
 60. See Petchesky, supra note 20, at 35 (noting that opponents of 
regulations on sterilization argue that involuntary sterilization should be 
sanctioned for certain groups, “in the interests of caretakers, taxpayers, 
parents, future children, or the retarded themselves.” See generally Lynn, 
supra note 29. 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 38 (1979)  (noting the lack of evidence illustrating that 
mildly retarded persons are incapable of raising children, and that 
there is little scientific basis for assuming a strict genetic 
determinism in most cases of mental disability . . .  . Like all 
variations in intelligence, its sources represent a complex set of 
interactions between genetic and environmental determinants; the 
genetic determinants of intellectual abilities cannot be isolated, since 
these are themselves affected by environmental conditions.). 
 62. See id. at 38–39 (1979) (arguing that the “summary denial of the 
childbearing rights of retarded persons is discriminatory” and suggesting that 
“it would seem necessary to deal with the question of childbearing capacity in 
terms of an individual situation rather than on a wholesale basis . . . .”). 
 63. See Findlater & Kelly, supra note 51, at 85. 
 64. See Osofsky, supra note 55, at 36 (noting that a literature review 
associates violence in the family with “adverse effects on children’s physical, 
cognitive, emotional, and social development”); id, at 40 (stating that 
“[p]rotecting children and facilitating their development is a family’s most 
basic function”). 
 65. Findlater & Kelly, supra note 51, at 86. 
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the best interests of the child.66  It is important to note that 
with adoption laws, the categorical consideration of race in 
adoption placements is no longer plausible, but considerations 
of racial sensitivity are still permitted.67  Thus, in deciding on 
the appropriate restrictions in the new realm of reproductive 
technologies, an approach more similar to child protection and 
adoption laws may be more beneficial.  It is therefore important 
to consider who is being protected, and for what reasons. 
III. THE MODERN ERA: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 
A. JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE REGULATED 
Almost three decades have passed since the first “test-
tube” baby was born, and the use of assisted reproductive 
technologies has captured the attention of the larger 
community.68  Popular media has often covered stories 
involving infertility services.69  Given the increasing use of 
infertility services, it is not surprising that the concern over 
limiting reproductive freedom extends into the provision of 
infertility services.  While the regulation of assisted 
reproductive technologies can exist in a variety of forms, this 
note focuses on limiting access to infertility services as an 
example of restricting reproductive freedom. 
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA) regulates reproductive 
technologies. 70  This act does not specifically list requirements 
that must be met in order to access infertility services.71  
Rather the HFEA Code of Practice takes a proscriptive 
approach by permitting access as long as the welfare of the 
                                                          
 66. See supra Part II.B. 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44. 
 68. See BONNICKSEN, supra note 16, at 14–15 (reciting warnings, and 
other excited expressions about ART). 
 69. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Her Embryos or His?: A Divorcing Houston 
Couple Agree on All But the Fate of Three Frozen, Fertilized Eggs. It’s a Legal 
Clash with Implications for Roe vs. Wade., L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at A1.; 
Jane E. Allen, Limiting Embryos: Doctors Report Fewer Multiple Births as a 
Result of In Vitro Fertilization, Although a Number of Patients Say They Want 
Twins—Or More., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at F3. 
 70. Kerry Petersen, The Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology: 
A Comparative Study of Permissive and Prescriptive Laws and Policies, 9 J.L. 
& MED. 483, 489 (2002) (Austl.). 
 71. Id. at 489. 
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child to be born is considered. 72  In practice, however, this does 
not mean that infertility clinics themselves do not take a more 
prescriptive approach when limiting access; there are clinics 
that deny access to lesbian women per se.73 
In Victoria, Australia, the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 
currently regulates the realm of infertility services and 
research.74  The legislation in Victoria is extremely 
prescriptive, and access is restricted by the eligibility 
requirements - of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995.  More 
specifically, the marriage relationship clause/de facto 
heterosexual relationship clause and the infertility clause state: 
 7. Persons who may undergo treatment procedures 
  (1) A woman who undergoes a treatment procedure must 
      (a) be married and living with her husband on a genuine 
domestic basis; or 
     (b) be living with a man in a de facto relationship.75 
And: 
 (3) Before a woman undergoes a treatment procedure – 
     (a) a doctor must be satisfied, on reasonable grounds, from an 
examination or from treatment he or she has carried out that the 
woman is unlikely to become pregnant from an oocyte produced by 
her and sperm produced by her husband other than by a treatment 
procedure . . . . 76 
Thus, there are two core requirements for access to 
infertility services (i.e. that the couple be in a married/de facto 
heterosexual relationship and clinical infertility). 
In the United States, there is no national law that 
                                                          
 72. See id. at 489–90. 
 73. See id. at 490. 
 74. Infertility Treatment (Amendment) Act 1997, No. 37 (Vict., Austl.), 
available at http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/ (follow “Victorian Statute Book” 
hyperlink; then follow “1997” hyperlink; then follow “Infertility Treatment 
(Amendment) Act 1997” hyperlink; then follow “97-037a.pdf (Acrobat - 149 
Kilobytes)” hyperlink), at 485. The original legislation was called The 
Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984. 
 75. Id. The amendment to the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 that 
expanded access to de facto couples occurred in 1997. See H W Gordon Baker, 
Problems with the Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology: A 
Clinician’s Perspective, 9 J.L. & MED. 457, 461 (2002) (Austl.). 
 76. Infertility Treatment Act 1995, No. 63 (Vict., Austl.), microformed on 
Acts of the Victorian Parliament 1995, pt. 2 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.). S. 
3(1) definition of “husband” inserted by No. 37/1996 s. 6(2): “husband”, in 
relation to a woman who is living with a man in a de facto relationship, means 
the man with whom she is living in that de facto relationship. Id. 
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regulates the use of reproductive technologies.77  In the absence 
of national (and state) regulation, private fertility clinics are 
free to restrict access in the manner they see fit.  Given the 
nature of these technologies, it is appropriate to address 
whether these restrictions are appropriate, and if so, how they 
should be fashioned.  While both Victoria and the United 
Kingdom have placed limitations on accessing infertility 
services, Victoria is unique in that it has chosen to enact strict 
requirements rather than guiding principles like in the United 
Kingdom.78  In deciding what these restrictions should look 
like, it is beneficial to assess the experiences of a jurisdiction 
that has chosen a prescriptive approach. 
B. THE VICTORIAN EXPERIENCE79 
Australia’s first test-tube baby was born in Melbourne, 
Victoria in 1980.  The Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 
was passed shortly after, and Victoria became the first 
jurisdiction to pass legislation that regulated infertility services 
and research.80  In 1995, the legislation was revised and 
became the Infertility Treatment Act 1995. 
The question as to who should have access to infertility 
services is especially relevant in Victoria because access is 
currently restricted by the eligibility requirements of section 8 
of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995.81  Victoria has regulated 
access to infertility services for over two decades, and several 
changes have been made to these requirements.  Under the 
Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, one of the 
requirements for access to infertility services was marital 
                                                          
 77. See SPAR supra note 1, at 5 (In the United States, however, regulatory 
and legislative authorities have largely ignored the market for reproductive 
services). 
 78. See generally Petersen, supra note 70 (comparing British and 
Victorian statutory regimes). 
 79. I spent a year in Victoria, Australia working with the Infertility 
Treatment Authority through the generous funding of the Australian-
American Fulbright Commission. During this year, I had the opportunity to 
interview several persons involved in the legislation, in an attempt to better 
understand why and how Victoria chose legislation as a means to provide 
oversight to infertility services and research. To preserve anonymity, I will not 
be using any identifying details when making reference to materials obtained 
during interviews unless otherwise given permission. 
 80. See Helen Szoke & Jennifer Gunning, Introduction, in THE 
REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 4 (Jennifer Gunning 
& Helen Szoke eds., 2003). 
 81. See supra p. 22. 
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status.82  De facto couples83 were not allowed to access 
infertility services under the 1984 legislation or the revision 
that became the Infertility Treatment Act 1995.84  In 1997, the 
Act was amended to allow de facto couples access to infertility 
services. 85  While access was expanded in 1997, there were still 
categories of people who were routinely denied access to 
infertility services.  In particular, single women and same-sex 
couples are still largely excluded from access to infertility 
services.  The following table depicts challenges to the access 
requirements of section 8(1) and 8(3a).86 
 
1996 Three unmarried/de facto 
couples take their case to the 
Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission 
(HREOC) after being denied 
access to IVF services by 
hospitals. 
1997 The case is decided in their 
favor (hospitals had breached 
the Commonwealth Sex 
Discrimination Act by refusing 
to allow them access to 
infertility services).  The 
Infertility Treatment Act 1995 is 
amended to extend access to de 
facto couples. 
1998 A single woman is denied access 
to infertility services and takes 
her case to the HREOC claiming 
                                                          
 82. Infertility (Medical Procedures) Treatment Act 1984, No. 10163 (Vict., 
Austl.), microformed on Acts of the Victorian Parliament 1984, pt. 2 (William 
S. Hein & Co., Inc.). 
 83. A de facto relationship “means the relationship of a man and a woman 
who are living together as husband and wife on a genuine domestic basis, 
although not married.” Infertility Treatment (Amendment) Act 1997, No. 37, 
pt. 2 § 6(2) (Vict., Austl.). 
 84. Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, No. 10163; Infertility 
Treatment Act 1995, No. 63. 
 85. See Baker, supra note 75, at 461. 
 86. See Szoke, supra note 3; Interview with John McBain (October 14, 
2005), in Melbourne, Australia; Baker, supra note 75; Helen Szoke, The Nanny 
State or Responsible Government? 9 J.L. & MED. 470 (2002) (Austl.). 
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discrimination. 
1999 The HREOC rules in favor of the 
single woman.  Infertility 
Treatment Act 1995 is not 
amended to incorporate tribunal 
ruling. 
2000 Dr. John McBain takes the 
above case to the Federal Court.  
The Federal Court rules that the 
marriage/de facto heterosexual 
relationship clause of the 
Infertility Treatment Act 1995 is 
inconsistent with the 
Commonwealth Sex 
Discrimination Act. 
2000 Provision regarding marriage/de 
facto heterosexual relationship 
clause becomes inoperative but 
clinical infertility remains a 
requirement for access. 
Given Victoria’s experience in restricting access and the 
challenges that have been made to these restrictions, it is 
possible to observe the rationale behind these limitations.  It 
thus becomes possible to discern which reasons are based on 
discrimination, as in the historical example of eugenics, and 
which are based on valid reasons, as in the current model of 
child protective services and adoption laws. 
In September of 2008, the Victorian government 
introduced the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Bill 2008 to 
its Parliament.87 This new bill will, among other things, 
“[e]nsure Victoria’s laws are compatible with Federal 
discrimination laws by providing that women regardless of 
marital status or sexual orientation can gain access to assisted 
reproductive treatment.”88 While this bill is still before 
Parliament, its very existence exemplifies the growing 
recognition that new laws were needed to better protect the 
rights of parties seeking ART services, as well as the rights of 
                                                          
 87. INFERTILITY TREATMENT AUTHORITY, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TREATMENT BILL 2008 (2008), 
http://www.ita.org.au/www/257/1001127/displayarticle/1001979.html. 
 88. Press Release, Infertility Treatment Authority, Reforms to Protect 
Children and Provide Certainty (Sept. 9, 2008), 
http://www.ita.org.au/secure/downloadfile.asp?fileid=1001975. 
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the children to be born.89 
IV. LIMITING ACCESS TO ART: ON WHAT GROUNDS? 
Traditional concepts of the nuclear family have changed 
drastically in the last few decades.90 This trend, in combination 
with the advent of assisted reproductive technologies, has 
enabled single women and same-sex couples to pursue 
parenthood.91  Given that single women and same-sex couples 
have often been denied access to infertility services on 
principle, the question then becomes whether or not these 
restrictions are warranted.92 
 By analyzing the Victorian experience in restricting 
access to infertility services, as well as the subsequent 
successful and unsuccessful attempts to amend the legislation 
to further expand access, it becomes possible to assess the 
rationale behind limiting access.  More specifically, by 
comparing the process that resulted in an amendment 
expanding access to de facto couples with the process that did 
not result in an expansion of access to single women and same-
sex couples, one can determine whether there is a fundamental 
difference between the two processes, or whether it is 
something else that has led to the different outcome. 
A. CHALLENGES TO THE VICTORIAN ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 
Under the original legislation, the Infertility (Medical 
Procedures) Act 1984 limited access to infertility services to 
married couples.93  Prior to this legislation, the Waller 
committee published a report in September of 1982 which 
                                                          
 89. See id. 
 90. See e.g., Vern L. Bengtson, Beyond the Nuclear Family: The Increasing 
Importance of Multigenerational Bonds, 63 J. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 1 (2001); 
Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the 
Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951 (1995-96). 
 91. See JOHN ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 13–14 (1994. See also 
Charlotte J. Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Couples Considering Parenthood: An 
Agenda for Research, Service, and Advocacy, 1 J. OF GAY AND LESBIAN SOCIAL 
SERVICES 33, 34 (1994); RUTH MCNAIR, OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN BORN OF 
A.R.T. IN A DIVERSE RANGE OF FAMILIES 1-2 (Victorian Law Reform 
Commission) (2004). 
 92. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, 
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 10 (1995) (considering 
the circumstances in which restrictions on parents or potential parents are 
justified). 
 93. See Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, No. 10163 (Vict., Austl.). 
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recommended that “the IVF programme be limited to cases in 
which the gametes are obtained from husband and wife and the 
embryos are transferred into the uterus of the wife.”94  In spite 
of this recommendation, during the 1984 Parliamentary 
debates, much argument ensued about whether de facto 
couples should be allowed access to IVF treatment.  As 
expressed by the Hon. C.J. Hogg, 
[i]f a couple is accepted into the programme, and withstands and 
comes through the battery of physical and psychological tests but 
those persons are not married and live in a bona fide domestic 
relationship, that should be it. They should be allowed into the 
programme and allowed to take the chance of having a successful 
course of treatment, just as a married couple would be able to.95 
This sentiment was widely expressed in the transcripts of 
the 1984 debates, both in the Legislative Council and the 
Legislative Assembly.96  However, when the Infertility (Medical 
Procedures) Act 1984 was passed, only married couples were 
eligible for infertility services.97 
This concern was raised again in 1991 when the Standing 
Review and Advisory Committee on Infertility, the monitoring 
body established by the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 
1984, proposed that the legislation be revisited.  Just as in the 
debates prior to the passage of the Infertility (Medical 
Procedures) Act 1984, several Parliament members voiced their 
concerns that de facto couples should be granted access to 
infertility services.  Take for example the following statements 
made during the debates that occurred prior to the passage of 
the Infertility Treatment Act 1995: 
[I]t absolutely amazes me that in 1995 we do not have a change in the 
legislation. I refer to the exclusion of de facto couples from the IVF 
program—in itself almost certainly a breach of the commonwealth 
Sex Discrimination Act and a provision absolutely out of step with 
community values and attitudes today.98 
                                                          
 94. COMM. TO CONSIDER  SOC., ETHICAL & LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN 
VITRO FERTILIZATION, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF THE VICTORIAN INQUIRY 
INTO IVF AND RELATED ISSUES 36 (2d reprint Aug. 1990). 
 95. Parliament of Victoria, Legislative Council 810 (October 23, 1984) 
(statement of C.J. Hogg). 
 96. The Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly are the two 
chambers of the Parliament of Victoria, Australia. 
 97. Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, No. 10163, pt.1 §§ 10(3)(a), 
11(3)(a) (Vict., Austl.). 
 98. Infertility Treatment Bill, Parliament of Victoria, Legislative Council 
1291 (1995) (statement of C.J. Hogg), available at 
http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.au/bin/texhtmlt?form=VicHansard.adv (under 
“All Members” select “Hogg”; under “Year” select “1995”; under “Month” select 
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The opposition is very concerned about the limitation on de facto 
couples gaining access to IVF treatment. The bill limits access to 
married couples only, precluding de facto couples. The federal Sex 
Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination on the ground of marital 
status. The opposition believes the bill breaches the federal act. 
Because the commonwealth constitution provides that commonwealth 
legislation overrides inconsistent state legislation in the same area, 
the opposition believes the attempt to limit IVF treatment to married 
couples and to exclude de facto couples will not only breach the 
commonwealth legislation but be ineffective. . . . The opposition 
believes they should not be excluded because it is unfair and 
discriminatory.99 
While members of Parliament vocalized their opposition to 
passing the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 without expanding 
access to de facto couples, these efforts to include de facto 
couples were not victorious.  The Infertility Treatment Act 1995 
was passed without alteration to the provisions which 
restricted access to infertility services to married couples.100 
However, in 1996, three de facto couples challenged their 
exclusion from IVF services to the Commonwealth Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC).  The 
HREOC ruled that this exclusion conflicted with the 
Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act.101  Hospitals in 
Victoria were thus placed in a predicament; the current 
Victorian law prevented hospitals from treating de facto 
couples, but by doing so they breached the Commonwealth 
legislation.  The Victorian Parliament responded quickly to the 
HREOC’s ruling and passed amendments to the Infertility 
Treatment Act 1995 in 1997 that extended access to de facto 
couples.102 
This successful change to the legislation occurred as a 
result of a variety of factors, key to which was the growing 
                                                          
“June”; under “Day” select “7”; check “Legislative Council Only”; click “Search” 
button; follow “INFERTILITY TREATMENT BILL” hyperlink on the Hansard 
Search Summary screen). 
 99. Infertility Treatment Bill, Parliament of Victoria, Legislative 
Assembly 1923 (1995) (statement by Rep. Thwaites), available at 
http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.au/bin/texhtmlt?form=VicHansard.adv (under 
“All Members” select “Thwaites”; under “Year” select “1995”; under “Month” 
select “May”; under “Day” select “30”; check “Legislative Assembly Only”; click 
“Search” button; follow “INFERTILITY TREATMENT BILL” hyperlink on the 
Hansard Search Summary screen). 
 100. This requirement is only one of several that must be met in order to be 
granted access to infertility services. 
 101. Baker, supra note 75, at 461. 
 102. See Petersen, supra note 70, at 492. 
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recognition of de facto couples and the subsequent challenge 
that was made to the HREOC.  As stated by Dr. Napthine 
during the 1997 debates, “I recognise, as I think the community 
recognises, that there are many stable de facto relationships in 
our society and that access to [infertility] treatment by people 
in those relationships is appropriate.”103 
While the amendment to expand access to de facto couples 
was passed less than two years after the HREOC challenge, a 
similar dispute to expand access to single women and same-sex 
couples has not resulted in a similar outcome.  In 1999, the 
HREOC found that a hospital had violated the Commonwealth 
Sex Discrimination Act when it denied access to donor sperm to 
a single woman.104  The HREOC ruled that single women were 
in fact being discriminated against by the marriage/de facto 
heterosexual relationship provision of the Infertility Treatment 
Act 1995.105  However, unlike the legislative response that 
followed the 1997 HREOC ruling regarding discrimination and 
de facto couples, there were no immediate steps taken by the 
Victorian Parliament to further amend the Infertility 
Treatment Act 1995.  Given the lack of response, in 2000, Dr. 
John McBain took this case to the Federal Court “seeking a 
declaration that the Victorian law was inoperative due to its 
inconsistency with the Sex Discrimination Act.”106 
In the McBain case, the Federal Court took the ruling of 
the HREOC tribunal a step further and gave it the force of law, 
                                                          
 103. Infertility Treatment (Amendment) Bill, Parliament of Victoria, 
Legislative Assembly 1711 (May 23, 1997) (statement of Rep. Napthine), 
available at 
http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.au/bin/texhtmlt?form=VicHansard.dumpall&db=
hansard91&dodraft=0&house=ASSEMBLY&speech=18092&activity=Second+
Reading&title=INFERTILITY+TREATMENT+(AMENDMENT)+BILL&date1
=23&date2=May&date3=1997&query=true%0A%09and+(+data+contains+%27
NAPTHINE%27+)%0A%09and+(+members+contains+%27NAPTHINE%27+)
%0A%09and+(+hdate.hdate_3+=+1997+)%0A%09and+(+hdate.hdate_2+contai
ns+%27May%27+)%0A%09and+(+hdate.hdate_1+=+23+)%0A%09and+(+house
+contains+%27ASSEMBLY%27+)%0A [hereinafter Infertility Treatment 
(Amendment) Bill]. 
 104. Leslie Cannold & Lynn Gillam, A New Consultation Management 
Process for Managing Divergent Community Views: Lesbian and Single 
Women’s Access to Artificial Insemination and ARTs, in THE REGULATION OF 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 203, 212 (Jennifer Gunning & Helen 
Szoke eds., 2003). 
 105. See Petersen, supra note 70, at 492 n.73. 
 106. Women’s Health Victoria, Fertility Access: The Victorian Situation,  
http://www.whv.org.au/factsheets/fertility_access_vic.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 
2008). 
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holding that the marriage and de facto heterosexual 
relationship requirement of the Victorian Infertility Treatment 
Act 1995 was inconsistent with the Commonwealth Sex 
Discrimination Act.107  Despite this ruling, the Victorian 
government did not respond by passing a legislative 
amendment to further extend access.  Instead, the Infertility 
Treatment Authority interpreted the ruling to mean that while 
the marriage and de facto heterosexual relationship provision 
was inoperative, the requirement for infertility still 
remained.108  This meant that while infertile single women and 
lesbian couples could access infertility services, fertile single 
women and lesbian couples remained ineligible. 
Practically, this ruling has done little to expand access to 
single women and same-sex couples, since the majority of them 
seek access to infertility services not because they are clinically 
infertile but because they are socially infertile.109  And despite 
the passage of a significant amount of time, and the knowledge 
from the previous challenge that the Victorian Parliament is 
indeed capable of amending legislative eligibility requirements, 
access has yet to be extended equally to single women and 
lesbian couples.  It is thus prudent to determine why a 
legislative amendment has not been passed in this instance, 
and whether this demonstrates a warranted differential 
legislative outcome. 
When comparing the challenge to extend access to de facto 
couples with the challenge to extend access to single women 
and lesbian couples, it is important to note that there are many 
similarities between the two examples.  Both parties claimed 
discrimination on the basis of the Sex Discrimination Act, both 
took their case to the HREOC, and both had rulings in their 
favor.  The only difference in process is that in the second 
                                                          
 107. SeeMcBain v. Victoria (2000) F.C.R. 1009 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2000/1009.html. See also 
Petersen, supra note 70, at 492. 
 108. INFERTILITY TREATMENT AUTHORITY, ELIGIBILITY FOR DONOR 
TREATMENT (2006), 
http://www.ita.org.au/www/257/1001127/displayarticle/1001214.html (stating 
that “[t]he ITA’s understanding is that parliament’s intention in section 20 
was to limit the use of donor gametes to instances where it is clinically 
necessary”). 
 109. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (2004) ( “Homosexuals may 
also seek ARTs for infertility, but more often they use them because they 
cannot reproduce with their partners or others of the same sex.”). 
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challenge there was a federal court ruling that favored 
expanding access.  Given that a federal court ruling would 
intuitively seem to make an amendment more likely, something 
else must explain why single women and lesbian couples have 
been denied access to infertility services. 
B. WHY DIFFERENT OUTCOMES? ARE THEY JUSTIFIED? 
In examining the rationale behind the difference in 
outcome, two main themes emerge—the role of community 
acceptance in legislative amendments,  and considerations as to 
the best interests and welfare of the child to be born. 
1. The Role of Community Acceptance 
In considering the first theme, many members of the 
Victorian community acknowledged that the level of societal 
acceptance of de facto couples versus that of single/lesbian 
women having access to IVF differed.110  Consider the following 
statements, each expressed by a member of the Victorian 
community: 
Well I think that’s what it is really because I think that particularly if 
society has changed, and we’re now much more accepting of men and 
women that live together that aren’t actually married. . . . [B]ut there 
are a lot of people in the community who are uncomfortable about gay 
relationships and about single women having children.111 
By 1997, in Victoria, unmarried heterosexual couples were basically 
treated, legally speaking, virtually identically to married couples.  
And that probably wasn’t the case in 1984 when the original act was 
passed.  Since the 1980s, throughout Australia, unmarried 
heterosexual couples are really the same as if you’re married. So 
that’s one reason. . . . But of course the other reason, it’s just 
politically much more sensitive to extend the act to single women and 
lesbians whereas it was politically not very difficult to extend it to 
people who really looked like they’re married.112 
                                                          
 110. See Infertility Treatment (Amendment) Bill, supra note 98, at 1711 
(“[T]he community recognises[] that there are many stable [heterosexual] de 
facto relationships in our society and that access to [infertility] treatment by 
people in those relationships is appropriate.”); see also JOYCE A. MARTIN ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2004 11 
(2006) (stating that 35.8% of births in the United States in 2004 were out of 
wedlock), available at http:// 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_01.pdf; Births out of wedlock 
“Pass 40%,” BBC NEWS, Feb. 21, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4733330.stm. 
 111. Interview with anonymous source,, in Melbourne, Vict. (Jan. 17, 
2006). 
 112. Interview with anonymous source, in Melbourne, Vict. (Nov. 18, 2005). 
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In part I suspect there is a general reluctance to open up the act and 
there’s no doubt, that there would still be a lot of debate in the 
community about the question of lesbian couples, less around single 
women I suspect, but lesbian couples.  It waxes and wanes but once 
it’s in front of the public, there’s always a lot of noise about it.113 
In reality, public attitudes with respect to single women 
and same-sex couples seeking access to IVF were significantly 
more hostile than attitudes toward married couples.114  The 
1998 Same Sex Relationships and the Law report published by 
the Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) gauged the level of 
community support that existed for lesbian access to IVF.  
According to a member of that commission, “there was general 
support within the community, within the Victorian 
community, to end discrimination on the basis of same-sex 
couples.”115  However, this attitude did not extend to giving 
same-sex couples access to IVF.  This report published the 
following statement with regard to that particular concern: 
The issues of access to reproductive technology and adoption rights 
for people in same sex relationships were the most contentious of all 
the issues raised by the Commission’s discussion paper. . . . After 
analysing the submissions, the Commission is of the opinion that 
further consideration and community consultation is necessary prior 
to any further reform in these areas.116 
Given that legislation is, in part, designed to reflect 
community values, the difference in public acceptance between 
de facto couples accessing infertility services versus single 
women and same-sex couples accessing infertility services may 
explain the difference in outcome.  However, even assuming 
that these differential attitudes explain this difference, is this 
rationale a valid justification for denying single women and 
same-sex couples access to infertility services? 
In making this consideration, it is important to first 
acknowledge the relationship between the majority’s 
perspective and the role of democracy.  On the one hand, it can 
be argued that “you have to respect the democratic process and 
respect what the majority argues for.”117  On the other hand, as 
                                                          
 113. Interview with anonymous source, in Melbourne, Vict. (Nov. 23, 2005). 
 114. See generally, Gabor T. Kovacs et al., Community Attitudes to Assisted 
Reproductive Technology: A 20-Year Trend, 179 MED. J. OF AUSTL. 536, 536–38 
(2003). 
 115. Interview with anonymous, in Melbourne, Vict. (Feb. 13, 2006). 
 116. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N VICT., SAME SEX RELATIONSHIPS AND 
THE LAW 28-29 (1998). 
 117. Interview with Bill Muehlenberg, Nat’l Vice President, Austl. Family 
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expressed by an associate law professor at Melbourne 
University, “[i]t may seem democratic to say a majority of 
people think you shouldn’t have kids so you can’t have kids, but 
majorities don’t always do what is right.”118  From a historical 
standpoint, there are several infamous examples in which 
majority opinions have not been proper.119  Thus, “it’s essential 
to our conception of democracy that there be certain 
fundamental values that are protected by politicians, by the 
laws, even against the fashions of the majority or the pressure 
groups or the media.”120  Since the extent to which the majority 
view should be reflected in policy is debatable, it is inconclusive 
whether negative community opinions warrant the denial of 
single women and same-sex couples to infertility services. 
While societal values should play a role in policy making, it 
is important to note that negative attitudes often occur with 
any new biotechnology.121  It is not uncommon for societal 
perceptions with regards to new technological advances to 
change over time.  When artificial insemination gained public 
attention in the early 1900s, people referred to it as promoting 
“a race of illegitimate souls.”122  During the early 1970s when 
scientists were pursuing the possibility of IVF, a British 
magazine wrote a cover story analogizing IVF to the atomic 
bomb.123  IVF was perceived as an “unethical medical 
experimentation on possible future human beings” and 
“inherently immoral” in the very beginning.124  During 1995, 
                                                          
Ass’n, in Melbourne, Vict. (Oct. 25, 2005). 
 118. Interview with anonymous, in Melbourne, Vict. (Nov. 18, 2005). 
 119. American slavery is a notorious and commonly cited example. 
 120. Interview with Anthony Fisher, Bishop, Archdiocese of Sydney, in 
Sydney, N.S.W. (Nov. 17, 2005). 
 121. See ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, PANDORA’S BABY 174 (2004): 
Emerging technologies, especially those that mimic functions we take 
to be central to our definitions of life and death and of what makes us 
unique and emphatically human, often seem gruesome or barbaric in 
prospect, filled with technical impossibilities or ethical conundrums. 
Blood transfusion, organ transplantation, mechanical respirators, and 
artificial insemination—all were greeted with suspicion at first. And 
then, as soon as these procedures have been done a few times without 
the sky caving in, the objections tend to fade away. 
 122. Id. at 10. 
 123. Id. at 86 (noting that the Nova article inferred that IVF babies were 
“the biggest threat since the atom bomb”). 
 124. Bonnicksen, supra note 16, at 15 (quoting and citing Paul Ramsey, a 
professor of religion); see also SPAR, supra note 1, at 26 (“For many outside 
observers, however, [the birth of Louise Brown, the first IVF baby], was 
somewhere between a nightmare and unmitigated sin; it was emblematic of 
both technology’s gruesome advance and the abnormal intervention of 
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almost three decades since the birth of the first “test-tube” 
baby, an estimated 2.8 million women had used infertility 
services such as IVF to treat infertility.125 
In addition to changing sentiments regarding new 
technologies, concerns about new applications of technologies 
also change over time.  Consider for example the following 
table, which depicts the attitudes of Australians over the past 
two decades as to whether married couples, single women, and 
lesbian women should have access to reproductive 
technologies.126 
Table 3.2: Should IVF be available to help infertile married 
couples? 
 July 1982-January 
1997 
October 2000-
November 2001 
Aggregate % of 
approval 
74.8% 85.6% 
 
Table 3.3: Should single women with no male partner have 
access to donor sperm? 
 1993 October 2000 
% of approval 18% 38% 
 
Table 3.4: Should lesbian women have access to donor 
sperm? 
 1993 October 2000 
% of approval 7% 31% 
 
The acceptability of various applications of infertility 
services have increased over time.  While the approval rate of 
using infertility services remains greater for married couples 
than for single and lesbian women, it must be noted that 
                                                          
humankind into nature’s realm.”). 
 125. Elizabeth Hervey Stephen &Anjani Chandra, Use of Infertility 
Services in the United States: 1995, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 132, 132 (2000) 
(noting that 42% of the 6.7 million women with fertility problems in 1995 
received fertility services); see also HENIG, supra note 121, at 229–30 (“By 
1983 ten years had passed . . . . During this single decade, this blink of an eye 
in objective time, a silent revolution had taken place in society’s view of 
children like Louise Brown, who by now was almost ready for kindergarten. 
Test tube babies had gone from being a risky and bizarre idea to being 
ordinary little everyday miracles . . . .”). 
 126. Kovacs et al., supra note 114, at 536–38 (2003). 
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infertility services have been available to married couples since 
1987 while single and lesbian women still only have limited 
access to infertility services. 
There is a history of objections and subsequent acceptance 
of the use of various biotechnologies.  Thus, the lack of societal 
approval of same-sex couples and single women accessing 
infertility services should not warrant excluding these 
categories of persons from these types of services. 
2. Looking to the Best Interests and Welfare of the Child to be 
Born 
The history of limiting reproductive freedoms in the United 
States illustrates that reproductive freedoms exist in 
relationship to other concerns.127  The question then becomes, 
is the exclusion of single women and same-sex couples more 
akin to the concerns that excused forced sterilization during 
the eugenics movement, or is this exclusion more similar to the 
apprehensions that justify current adoption and child 
protection laws?  In answering this question, it becomes 
important to identify who is being protected, and for what 
reasons. 
Part 1, § 5 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 states the 
Act’s guiding principles.  Central among these principles is that 
“the welfare and interests of any person born or to be born as a 
result of a treatment procedure are paramount.”128  This is 
similar to the impetus behind adoption and child protection 
laws; the focus is on the best interests and welfare of children.  
Several other jurisdictions restrict access to infertility services 
on the same grounds.  While the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 in the United Kingdom does not make 
                                                          
 127. See supra Part II. 
 128. The section states: 
5. Guiding principles 
(1) It is Parliament’s intention that the following principles be given 
effect in administering this Act, carrying out functions under this Act, 
and in the carrying out of activities regulated by this Act- 
  (a) the welfare and interests of any person born or to be born as a 
result of a treatment procedure are paramount; 
  (b) human life should be preserved and protected; 
  (c) the interests of the family should be considered; 
  (d) infertile couples should be assisted in fulfilling their desire to 
have children. 
(2) These principles are listed in descending order of importance and 
must be applied in that order. 
Infertility Treatment Act 1995, No. 63, pt. 1 § 5 (Vict., Austl.). 
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categorical exclusion from access to infertility services, it states 
that the welfare of the child must be considered when deciding 
which women shall be provided infertility services.129  In 
addition, private fertility clinics in the United States have been 
known to engage in gatekeeping in an attempt to safeguard 
child safety and welfare.130  The uniformity across these 
various examples suggests that the welfare and interests of the 
child are a valid justification for limiting access to infertility 
services. 
However, this uniformity does not demonstrate that 
excluding single women and same-sex couples is actually in the 
best interests of the child.  In order to determine whether this 
is the case, it is important to consider the factors that are 
relevant in determining what is in the best interests of the 
child, and whether one can categorically state that single 
women and same-sex couples do worse on these measures. 
These deliberations go beyond merely protecting children 
from physical harm, but also inquiring as to what would 
promote the best interests of the child.131  The UN Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child provides further guidance, stating 
that children should have the opportunity to “develop 
physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a 
healthy and normal manner . . . .”132  In addition, other factors 
that should be considered are “commitment, age, medical 
histories, ability to meet the needs of child or children, any risk 
to the child, including that of inherited disorders, and the effect 
on any existing child of the family.”133 
In excluding same-sex couples and single women from 
access to infertility services, the assumption is that children do 
worse in these households and/or are harmed by being brought 
up by these parents. 134  In adoption and child custody cases, 
                                                          
 129. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (c. 37). See Petersen, 
supra note 70, at 489. 
 130. See Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In 
Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2299—3000 (2007) (discussing gatekeeping as a 
“prominent” feature of “clinical gatekeeping”). 
 131. See Id. 
 132. G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), supra note 48. 
 133. Storrow, supra note 130, at 2307 (quoting IFFS Surveillance 2004, 81 
FERTILITY & STERILITY  S33 (2004)). 
 134. Robertson, supra note 109, at 331; See Marsha Garrison, Law Making 
for Baby Making: An Interpretative Approach to the Determination of Legal 
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courts and state legislatures have been known to prefer 
heterosexual parents over homosexual parents.135  In addition, 
a study conducted on gatekeeping practices of fertility clinics 
showed that being single or in a lesbian relationship were two 
potential grounds for denying services to candidates.136  That 
is, these clinics would potentially deny access categorically on 
these grounds without independent inquiry as to whether these 
candidates would in fact harm the child to be born. 
Despite these practices, and perceptions that children do 
worse when raised in single parent and lesbian parent 
households, there is a lack of evidence supporting this 
assertion.137  Rather, the evidence points to the fact that single 
women and same-sex couples can be just as good parents as 
married/de facto couples.138  For example, in Adoption of 
Tammy, which involved a same-sex couple, the judge found 
that adoption by the couple would be in the best interest of the 
child.139  Studies have shown that children with lesbian parents 
develop similarly to children with heterosexual parents in 
regards to parent-child relationship, socio-emotional 
development, psychiatric ratings, and gender development.140  
Research also indicates that family processes and relationships 
(and not family structure) are responsible for how well a child 
does emotionally, socially, and psychologically.141  It is also 
important to note that women, whether single or in a same-sex 
relationship, who seek infertility services will have given 
parenthood much more deliberation than many people who 
                                                          
Parentage 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 894 (2000) (stating that most Americans 
believe that children are better off in two-parent households). 
 135. Robertson, supra note 109, at 331. 
 136. Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 65 
(2005). 
 137. Id. at 2306 ( “[N]o data exists showing that special patient groups—
gays, lesbians, single women, and those too aged to procreate naturally—are 
invariably poor parents . . . .”); JACKSON, supra note 5, at 193. 
 138. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 109, at 371 ( “Given that gay and 
lesbian parents are equally capable of providing a caring and meaningful 
rearing environment as are other persons, there is no basis for claiming that 
offspring are harmed by being born to gay and lesbian parents”). 
 139. See Massachusetts Allows, supra note 40, at 751. 
 140. VICT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY & 
ADOPTION: FINAL REPORT 32 (2007). 
 141. Id.; see JACKSON, supra note 5, at 193 (“The chief causes of problems 
experienced by children who grow up with a single mother are poverty, 
isolation, residential mobility and the family discord associated with parental 
separation.”). 
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become parents by accident.142 
Thus, the assumption that being raised by a single parent 
or by lesbian parents is contrary to the welfare and interests of 
the child is unsubstantiated.  As such, it cannot be used as a 
justification to restrict the reproductive freedoms of single 
women and same-sex couples such that they are excluded from 
accessing infertility services. 
C. INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS 
Two main themes emerge from the Victorian experience as 
reasons for justifying the exclusion of single women and same-
sex couples from infertility services.  However, both reasons are 
insufficient to justify such restrictions.  The Victorian 
experience has also revealed two additional reasons why single 
women and same-sex couples should not be denied access to 
infertility services. 
1. Categorical Discrimination 
First, these exclusions categorically exclude single women 
and same-sex couples from access to infertility services and are 
discriminatory.  It is not uncommon for fertility clinics to deny 
access to services based solely on the ground that the couple 
seeking the services is homosexual.143  The existence of such 
categorical limitations on reproductive freedoms resembles the 
history and rationale of forced sterilizations during the 
eugenics movement.144  Instead of a wholesale analysis of the 
individual situation and the factors relevant to childrearing, 
this exclusion accepts as true the unsubstantiated assumptions 
of the unfitness of single women and same-sex couples to be 
parents.145  To misuse the welfare of the child and/or societal 
values as a means to discriminate and express a preference for 
nuclear families is arguably similar to the unwarranted 
assumptions that were used to sterilize undesirables during the 
                                                          
 142. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 195. 
 143. Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 30, 2005), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/papers/art30/. 
 144. See Petchesky, supra note 20, at 38 (1979) (“[S]ummary denial of the 
childbearing rights of retarded persons is discriminatory.”). 
 145. See id. at 38-39 (1979) (“[I]t would seem necessary to deal with the 
question of childbearing capacity in terms of an individual situation rather 
than on a wholesale basis.”). 
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eugenics movement.146  As such, history should tell us that 
these exclusions are not only unwarranted, but discriminatory 
as well.147 
2. Public Health Risks 
Second, single women and same-sex couples that are 
otherwise excluded from access to infertility services often use 
other means to get access, leading to public health risks to both 
the woman and the child to be born.  In Victoria, women who 
are denied access to infertility services sometimes travel to 
places where they do have access or self-inseminate in order to 
become pregnant.148  Victorian women are not alone in this, as 
other studies have shown that American women who are 
otherwise denied access based on their marital status or sexual 
orientation resort to self-insemination as well.149 
In self inseminating, these women no longer have access to 
the routine screening that is otherwise conducting when donor 
sperm is utilized.  As such, these women are putting 
themselves at higher risk for health problems.150  In the United 
States, federal regulation requires that donated sperm be kept 
for six months and screened for HIV and other sexually 
transmitted diseases.151  Such safeguards are important given 
the existence of at least a dozen international cases of women 
who were infected with HIV as a result of artificial 
                                                          
 146. See supra Part II.A. 
 147. See, e.g.,  Storrow, supra note 130, at 2308 (“[B]lanket judgments 
about whole classes of persons who might wish to employ assisted 
reproduction or about specific types of assisted reproduction is not the 
direction family policy should take.”). 
 148. VICT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 140, at 26. 
 149. To elaborate: 
Exclusionary practices based on marital status or sexual orientation 
have forced some women to conclude third-party arrangements with 
known or anonymous donors. It has been reported that at least 1,500 
unmarried women a year in the United States are having children by 
means of [donor insemination] DI despite the difficulty of gaining 
access to mainstream DI services. 
BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 92, at 106 (citation omitted); Also: 
Due to discriminatory access to the medicalized system of sperm 
procurement, an unknown amount of AI occurs outside doctors offices 
with privately procured sperm and self-administration via turkey 
basters or syringes. It has become an important avenue to pregnancy 
and child rearing for women who lack a male partner and wish to 
reproduce. 
Robertson, supra note 109, at 8. 
 150. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 92, at 106. 
 151. See SPAR, supra note 1, at 37; JACKSON, supra note 5, at 224. 
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insemination using donor sperm between 1981 and 1985.152  
Women who self-inseminate assume unnecessary, higher risks 
for infection, not only with HIV but also with other sexually 
transmitted diseases.153 
In Victoria, women who undergo donor insemination in 
other settings are not guaranteed the safeguards that are 
otherwise provided for women who use infertility services in a 
clinical setting.  For example, Victorian legislation requires the 
donor’s identity to be registered.154  Children born to women 
who inseminate outside Victoria may be unable to obtain 
information about their donor’s identity.  This is in contrast to 
women who are inseminated in a clinical setting within 
Victoria.155  Victorian women are also provided with counseling 
and legal guidance as to what it means to use donor sperm to 
have a child.156  Outside the Victorian clinical setting, these 
safeguards cannot be guaranteed.  As a result, women who self 
inseminate or travel out of state for access may be at a higher 
risk for legal and psychosocial problems.  Furthermore, because 
Section 7 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 provides that 
only doctors are permitted to inseminate outside the clinical 
setting, some women who self inseminate are afraid to seek 
advice because they believe their actions are illegal.157 
                                                          
 152. Mary E. Guinan, Sperm Banks Should be Regulated, in 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 169, 169 (Bruno Leone et al. eds., 1996). 
 153. Compare Guinan, supra note 152, at 170-71 (arguing that women who 
self-inseminate are at higher health risks) with Garrison, supra note 134, at 
908 (arguing that women who self-inseminate can make use of private services 
in order to screen donor sperm). 
 154. VICT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 140, at 75. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. The relevant section states: 
7. Donor Inseminations 
(1) A person may only carry out artificial insemination of a woman 
using sperm from a man who is not the husband of the woman at a 
place other than a hospital or centre licensed under Part 8 for the 
carrying out of donor insemination if he or she- 
(a) is a doctor who is approved under Part 8 to carry out donor 
insemination; and 
(b) is satisfied that the requirements of Divisions 2, 3 and 4 and 
section 36 have been met. 
Penalty: 480 penalty units or 4 years imprisonment or both. 
Infertility Treatment Act 1995, No. 63, pt. 2 div. 1 § 7 (Vict., Austl.); see, e.g., 
VICT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 140, at 77 (reporting that some 
women who self-inseminate “fear seeking appropriate health or legal advice 
because they believe that self-insemination is illegal and subject to penalties”). 
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The negative effects of alternative methods of donor 
insemination and accessing infertility services outside Victoria 
impact not only the women, but the children to be born as well.  
Children born may lack access to identifying information about 
their donor, as other jurisdictions may not require this 
information to be registered. From a preventive health 
perspective, it may be important for donor conceived children to 
be aware of their genetic background. Most diseases result from 
the interaction of multiple genes and environmental factors 
and cannot be detected using available DNA technology.158 
Thus, family history is an important tool in disease prevention 
and early detection; family risk can help predict risk for many 
chronic diseases such as heart disease and breast cancer.159 
Given that one of the Act’s guiding principles is that “the 
welfare and interests of any person born or to be born as a 
result of a treatment procedure are paramount,”160 these 
exclusions have the opposite effect and end up harming 
children born as a result of these methods. 
Excluding single women and same-sex couples from access 
to infertility services is not only discriminatory, but may have 
the effect of contradicting efforts to safeguard the interests of 
the children born using these technologies.  The Victorian 
experience thus illustrates the undesirability of categorically 
excluding persons from infertility services based on sexual 
orientation or marital status. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Victoria, clinical gatekeeping to infertility services is a 
statutory requirement.  The legislation prescribes that the 
welfare and interests of the child to be born must be taken into 
account, and that persons must be clinically infertile to access 
infertility services.  In the United States, in the absence of 
state and national regulation, clinical gatekeeping is performed 
by many fertility clinics with clinicians screening using similar 
concerns.  Given the prevailing belief that the welfare and 
interests of the child are not served by being raised by single 
                                                          
 158. NATIONAL OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH GENOMICS, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL FAMILY HISTORY PUBLIC HEALTH INITIATIVE (2007), 
http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/famhistory/famhist.htm. 
 159. Alan E. Guttacher, Francis S. Collins, & Richard H. Carmona. The 
Family History – More Important Than Ever. 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2333 
(2005). 
 160. Infertility Treatment Act 1995, No. 63, pt. 1 § 5(1)(a). 
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women and same-sex couples, these persons have often been 
categorically excluded from access to infertility services in both 
the United States and Victoria. 
Adoption and child protective services have illustrated the 
acceptability of using the interests and welfare of the child as 
justifying limitations on reproductive freedoms.  However, the 
experience of forced sterilization during the eugenics movement 
illustrates the necessity of careful inquiry when limiting these 
freedoms.  Unlike the restrictions on reproductive freedoms in 
adoption and child protection services, the categorical denial of 
same-sex couples and single women from access to infertility 
services cannot be justified.  The experiences of Victoria 
demonstrates that such exclusions cannot be defended on the 
grounds that it is merely a representation of societal values, or 
that they are in the best interests of the children to be born.  
The experiences of Victorian women who self-inseminate and 
travel interstate to access infertility services also exemplify the 
negative implications that may result from these exclusions. 
Categorical exclusion based on marital status or sexual 
orientation, whether prescribed by legislation or by private 
fertility clinics, contends to be a limitation based on the 
interests and welfare of the child to be born.  However, the 
unequal application of gatekeeping is not based on 
substantiated evidence that doing so furthers the interests of 
children, and may in fact harm the interests of children.  As 
such, these categorical exclusions may purport to limit 
reproductive freedoms in a manner similar to adoption and 
child protection services, but in reality limit in a manner more 
similar to forced sterilizations.  These exclusions do not 
categorically protect and prevent harm to future children, but 
rather, rely on stereotypes, misinformation, and discriminatory 
practices to deny reproductive freedoms to single women and 
same-sex couples. Any limitations to reproductive freedoms in 
the realm of infertility services should be based on relevant 
“parenting” factors, rather than unsubstantiated blanket 
judgments about the suitability of certain persons to be 
parents. 
